mate businesses and individuals to the harsh penalties of RICO. While RICO's civil remedy was designed to allow citizens to sue and recover as "private attorneys general" in the fight against structured criminality, RICO claims are today being filed in a wide universe of commercial business disputes, and against a very diverse group of defendants. 5 In fact, because of the relative ease with which a plaintiff can incorporate a RICO count into any civil complaint, the statute has been termed a plaintiff's "darling." 6 Although several courts have attempted to restrain these abuses by emasculating the treble damage remedy,7 the Supreme Court, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 8 refused to grant the judiciary this remedial power. While acknowledging that " [civil] RICO [has] evolv [ ed] into something quite different from the original conception,"9 the Court stated that statutory amendments to civil RICO could not come through judicial intervention. Rather, they must come through legislative action.· Although the burden of restricting RICO was placed mainly on Congress, the Court did not foreclose all judicial efforts to limit the statute's applicability. Instead, Sedima specifically extended an invitation to the lower courts to develop a consistent definition of a key operative term in the RICO statute: the "pattern of racketeering activity" requirement. Io The RICO statute prohibits a person from investing, acquiring, or participating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. (1987) .
5. Ill. 1985 ) (Sedima creates a "whole new ballgame" as to the meaning of the pattern requirement). For the view that Sedima foreclosed any attempt to limit civil RICO through the "pattern of racketeering activity" requirement, see Note, Reconsideration of Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 83, 92-93 (1986) .
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) prohibits four types of offenses: 1) § 1962(a) makes it unlawful to invest income in an enterprise that was derived "from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt."
2) § 1962(b) forbids "any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through col-terms as "person," 12 "enterprise," 13 and "racketeering activity" 14 have been developed, a consistent definition of "pattern" 15 has eluded the courts. Because RICO's framers believed that repeated, continuous demonstrations of illegal activity characterize professional criminal behavior, proving that the defendant has engaged in such a pattern of racketeering activity has become the focal point in many civil RICO disputes. 16 Clarifying the ambiguity over pattern is thus vital to civil [Vol. 86:1745 RICO's enforcement. Construing the requirement broadly would allow many claims to proceed whereas a narrow construction could restrict the statute's applicability. 17 Since Sedima, however, the confusion over what level of wrongful activity is required to trigger RICO liability has increased. In fact, the effort to define this concept adequately has become, as one court noted, a "cottage industry," 18 and has bitterly divided both courts and commentators. 1 9 Three major approaches have emerged in the lower courts. The most restrictive view holds that a pattern is demonstrated only if the defendant's predicate acts (e.g., mail or wire fraud) occur in multiple and separate criminal schemes or episodes. 20 Other courts have taken a more expansive view of pattern, stating that any two related predicate acts (e.g., two phone calls made in an attempt to defraud) can constitute a pattern of racketeering activity and subject the defendant to treble damages. 21 A third view has rejected any brightline test, instead preferring to analyze several factors on a case-by-case basis. 22 To illustrate the impact these positions can have, consider the case where a securities dealer, in a single sale, intentionally makes certain misrepresentations in the initial telephone calls as well as in a series of follow-up letters. In such a case, the proponents of the first view would dismiss the RICO claim since only a single commercial scheme [1969] [1970] 17. The Sedima Court noted the impact that differing concepts of pattern could produce by stating that the admitted breadth of the statute derived mainly from the "failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.' " 473 U.S. at 500.
18. Morris v. Gilbert, 649 F. Supp. 1491, 1502 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). One federal appeals court judge called the "pattern jurisprudence" a "mess,'' a "cacophony," and "sheer bedlam.'' Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 908-10 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting).
19. For a description of the academic confusion over the pattern requirement, see note 86
infra. 20. The Eighth Circuit is the only appellate court accepting the multiple schemes approach. See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986). However, numerous district courts have accepted this position. See note 57 infra and cases cited therein. In addition to multiple schemes, some courts have adopted the slightly less restrictive multiple or different "episodes" test. For cases following this approach, see notes 66-70 infra.
21. See 1987 ) (analyzing such factors as the number and similarity of unlawful acts, the duration of the illicit activity, and the number of victims); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1987) (same); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (same; also focusing on the occurrence of distinct injuries).
to defraud is involved. Conversely, advocates of the second view would clearly support the finding of a pattern, because more than two related predicate acts are involved. The issue would be less clear for those holding the final position, because while several predicate acts are alleged, the duration of the overall fraud might not be enough to encompass a pattern. · This inconsistent application has resulted in unseemly forum-shopping.23 Currently, similarly pied complaints can survive in the Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which often adopt the expansive view, but be dismissed in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, which utilize a more restrictive approach. The possibility exists that with the same set of facts, plaintiff's counsel could obtain a large treble recovery in one court, but suffer sanctions for bringing the same action in a different court. 24 The recent decision by the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in H.J. Inc. v . Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 25 may result in a reduction of these inconsistencies.
In an attempt to provide some needed definitional clarity and redirect civil RICO toward its intended focus, this Note argues that the federal judiciary should interpret the pattern requirement narrowly, focusing on four basic factors that best demonstrate a prolonged, continuing example of criminal activity. By emphasizing (1) the presence of multiple victims, (2) the duration of the RICO defendant's criminal activity, (3) the number of illicit commercial transactions, and (4) the existence of independent criminal decisions, courts could consistently limit civil RICO to the most pernicious offenders. Part I of this Note will examine judicial interpretations of RICO and the current problems plaguing the application of the pattern requirement. Part II will analyze several techniques of statutory construction and will argue that while the operative pattern provision may be somewhat ambiguous, it can certainly support a narrow construction. Part III will examine the two primary justifications for interpreting the pattern requirement narrowly and will show that the original legislative command that RICO apply only to defendants engaged in repetitive and continuous criminal behavior has been ignored. Part IV identifies the goals for an optimal definition of pattern and examines the four factors necessary to limit civil RICO to repeat offenders. This section will 23. Not only do the different applications of pattern encourage litigants to search for the most sympathetic forum, but RICO's liberal venue and service of process provisions allow plaintiffs to sue in a wide range of district courts. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1965{b) (1982) authorizes nationwide service of process, there are no obstacles to suing RICO defendants in any state, unlike diversity cases which require that the defendant possess minimum contacts with the forum state. [Vol. 86:1745 also discuss two recent cases, including the one currently before the Supreme Court, and will illustrate how these factors should be applied by the courts. Finally, Part V will briefly discuss the broader question of how to amend civil RICO permanently and will analyze and critique the congressional proposals currently pending.
I. CIVIL RICO'S JUDICIAL TREATMENT AND THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY
The judiciary's active treatment of civil RICO can be separated into two distinct eras: the cases decided before and after Sedima. Concerned with the expanding applications of RICO, several courts crafted a number of additional requirements onto the statute. In conclusively rejecting these attempts, the Sedima Court also directed lower courts to develop and apply a consistent meaning of the pattern requirement. Since then, the entire federal judiciary has struggled to fulfi11 this directive. Of the three major positions developed by the courts, only one, the multiple factors approach, comes close to providing the necessary consistency and respect for congressional intent.
A. Early Attempts To Restrict Civil RICO: The Pre-Sedima Cases
In response to the growing use of RICO in areas and against defendants that Congress never intended, judicial hostility toward civil RICO began to rise. 26 Rather than accept these suits, many district courts began attempting to confine RICO to traditional organized crime by imposing a number of limitations on the statute. These courts reasoned that since Congress could not have intended to federalize all "garden variety" fraud claims, the judiciary was in the best, and only, position to impose limitations on private RICO actions; this was especially true given the lack of "prosecutorial restraint" in the marginal civil cases. 2 1
Between the mid-1970s and Sedima (in 1985), the courts fashioned four restrictions on civil RICO claims. The initial effort concerned attempts to impose an "organized crime" requirement on the statute. Under this approach, plaintiffs were required to establish that the defendant or his activities had some connection to organized crime. 28 In denying a RICO claim, one court noted the "patently unfair" implication that the defendant, a telephone answering service, was somehow involved in organized crime. 29 However, while RICO may have been intended as a weapon against organized crime, the statute obviously does not contain a requirement that defendants be a member of a class of organized criminals. 30 Because the statute explicitly rejects this requirement, and because imposing this additional RICO pleading requirement constituted an impermissible example of judicial legislating, most courts rejected the organized crime requirement. 31 A second method used by the courts to curb inappropriate civil RICO claims was to require plaintiffs to prove some type of "competitive injury." Rather than recognizing injuries resulting from the defendants' predicate offenses, these courts allowed RICO liability to attach only when a plaintiff was injured by having to compete with an enterprise that had garnered an unfair market advantage by using income obtained from racketeering activity. 32 The primary justification for this requirement was that because the civil treble damage remedy was modeled after the remedies contained in section 4 of the Clayton Act, 33 and because this language has been interpreted to require antitrust plaintiffs to show a competitive injury, 34 the courts reasoned that civil RICO should contain the same requirement. 35 Most courts, however, rejected this analysis, stating instead that the plain language of RICO mentions nothing about any competitive injury requirement. 36 These courts also rejected the concept that RICO is a sister to the antitrust laws. Rather, they suggested that RICO has broader aims and in fact was enacted "as a separate tool in the fight against orga- [Vol. 86:1745 nized crime." 37 The final two attempts to restrict civil RICO occurred in the Second Circuit's Sedima decision. 38 There, the court held that standing in civil RICO suits could only be given to those who suffered "an injury of the type RICO was designed to prevent." 39 In construing section 1962 to require a "racketeering injury," the Second Circuit joined the several district courts which had adopted a similar standing restriction. 40 But more importantly, the court held that, before the treble damage remedy could be imposed, the defendant must first have been convicted of either a section 1962 offense or the underlying predicate offenses. 41 By formulating this prior conviction requirement, the court adopted a severely restrictive interpretation of civil RICO; for the Second Circuit, the only way to contain the "explosive" use of civil actions against "respected businesses" was to require a criminal conviction before imposing treble damages. 42 Not only did this decision disregard prior case law4 3 and congressional intent, but it markedly increased the call for an end to all the judicially imposed restrictions and requirements. Commentators asserted that until Congress manifested a contrary intent, the "federal judiciary should not restrict a statute whose plain language directs a sweeping attack at deeply entrenched economic and societal ills. " 44 With the debate over the propriety of judicial reform of RICO grow- 
B. The Sedima Decision and Its Implications for Further Judicial
Restriction of Civil RICO The Supreme Court's Sedima decision provided only partial guidance; while it firmly rejected the prior attempts to eviscerate civil RICO, the Court opened up a new avenue for narrow construction of the statute. In reversing the Second Circuit, a sharply divided Court (per Justice White) rejected both the prior conviction and racketeering injury requirements. Finding support for a criminal conviction prerequisite in neither the statutory language nor the legislative history, the Court concluded that this requirement "would be inconsistent with Congress' underlying policy concerns. Such a rule would severely handicap potential plaintiffs .... Private attorney general provisions such as § 1964( c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps." 45 As for the racketeering injury limitation, the Court rejected any additional standing requirements for section 1962 claims and added that plaintiffs can recover as long as they show injury to their business or property through a RICO predicate offense. 46 While the Court expressed grave doubts over the expanding applications of civil RICO, the majority stipulated that this problem should be cured through legislative amendment rather than through judicial fiat. 47 Because Sedima represented the Supreme Court's first examination of civil RIC0, 48 its rejection of the varied attempts to limit RICO liability is surely meaningful. Limitations like the prior conviction requirement would have completely emasculated the treble damage weapon in violation of the intention of its authors. Yet it must be emphasized that Sedima did not extinguish all attempts to limit the scope of this private remedy. In the now-famous footnote 14, Justice White explored the parameters of the pattern requirement, even though this issue was not even before the Court. Indeed, Justice White specifically attributed the "extraordinary" reach of civil RICO to the "failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.' " 49 To aid the lower courts in their effort to develop this concept, White emphasized that the target of RICO was not sporadic activity; rather, "[t]he legislative history supports the view RICO in securities fraud cases is a desirable way to achieve goal of applying statute against organized crime).
45 that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern. "50 Given this intent, and the statement that the elements of "continuity plus relationship" combine to produce a pattern, 51 the Court clearly signaled that a more restrictive interpretation of pattern was allowable.
C. The Post-Sedima Debate over the Pattern Requirement
Given that Sedima precluded restrictions that would vitiate the private treble damage remedy while inviting courts to limit the pattern requirement, the debate over RICO's scope has now centered on the definition of pattern. In the past three years, courts have had great difficulty interpreting Sedima's invitation to develop a consistent definition of pattern. In part, this is because Sedima asked the courts to read RICO broadly but to read the pattern requirement narrowly. Mostly, however, confusion has resulted from the Court's failure to provide adequate direction in footnote 14. While the Court said that a pattern had to combine "continuity plus relationship" and include "more than two isolated acts," 52 it did not elaborate on how many "acts" or how much "continuity" was required. As a result, the federal judiciary has developed three differing views as to what the pattern requirement means.
''Multiple Schemes" and ''Different Episodes"
Just four weeks after Sedima was decided, the first attempt to redefine the pattern requirement . appeared. In Northern Trust Bank/ O'Hare, N.A. v. lnryco, Inc., 53 the defendant was accused of participating in a construction kickback scheme implemented through two acts of mail fraud (mailing the subcontract and mailing the kickback check). Noting that "Sedima ... create[d] a whole new ballgame," Judge Shadur asserted that Sedima's "message was both plain and deliberate: Lower courts concerned about RICO's expansive potential would be best advised to focus on the hitherto largely ignored 'pattern' concept." 54 In response to this "concern," the court held that, while the two acts were clearly related, the pattern requirement was not met because continuity of activity was absent. Pattern, Judge Shadur noted, "connotes a multiplicity of events: Surely the continuity inherent in the term presumes repeated criminal activity, not merely repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activity. It places a real 50. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. 51. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (quoting from 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 158). 52. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. Requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate two separate schemes in order to show continuity has been widely accepted on the district court level. 57 However, lnryco's logic has been criticized by several commentators, 58 rejected by several courts of appeals, 59 and followed at the appellate level only by the Eighth Circuit in Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer. 60 In Superior Oil the defendant had been unlawfully processing gas from the plaintiff's pipeline, and had committed several acts of mail and wire fraud in pursuit of this one underlying activity. 61 In holding that this did not possess the requisite continuity needed for pattern, the court stated that "there was no proof that [defendants] had ever done these activities in the past and there was no proof that they were engaged in other criminal activities elsewhere." 62 As only "one isolated fraudulent scheme" was alleged, the court dismissed the RICO claims and restricted plaintiff's recovery to other federal and state fraud claims. 63 61 An "episode" has been construed to require several separate transactions, even if the single scheme involves the same wrongdoers and the same victims. One implication of this approach is that fraud or other misconduct committed in the course of a single transaction will never constitute a pattern. As a result, courts have refused to find a pattern arising out of a single contract or sale of goods, a single audit engagement, or a single merger agreement or tender offer. 68 However, a demonstrated number of independent criminal episodes, even if perpetrated under one continuing scheme, can comprise a pattern of ongoing conduct. 69 Besides generating substantial judicial support, the different episodes test has been endorsed by two American Bar Association committees. 10
A Sole Focus on Relatedness
The broadest construction of pattern can be found in the Fifth Circuit's decision in R. fendant allegedly defrauded the plaintiff by twice mailing him false invoices. Despite Sedima's emphasis on relationship and continuity, 72 the court held that continuity was unnecessary. The Fifth Circuit declared: "The Supreme Court in Sedima implied that two 'isolated acts' would not constitute a pattern. In this case, however, the alleged acts of mail fraud are related." 73 Thus, for the R.A. G.S. court, a pattern required only two related mailings in furtherance of a single fraud. 74 The implications for civil RICO of such an interpretation of pattern are considerable. For example, under R.A. G.S., two phone calls made in an attempt to defraud a single plaintiff out of $1,000 could expose the defendant to treble damages and the stigma of the "racketeer" label.
While (1987) , the Second Circuit also rejected the continuity requirement, stating that "the Sedima footnote does not rise to the level of a holding, [and] is [thus] not controlling." 808 F.2d at 190. Since Ianniello, however, the Second Circuit has moved away from its expansive interpretation of civil RICO claims and has begun to emphasize continuity of conduct in the definition of "enterprise." This Circuit thus simultaneously utilizes a broad definition of pattern with a requirement that the defendant's "enterprise," as defined in note 13 supra, be continuing.
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The Multi-Factor Approach
While the above approaches concentrate heavily on the number of predicate acts or schemes present, other courts have expanded their inquiry beyond such issues. These courts have set forth a variety of factors that together contribute to a finding of pattern. The Seventh Circuit, in Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 80 has been the major proponent of the multi-factor approach. Although Morgan involved several predicate acts within a single grand scheme, the court attempted to "steer[ ] a middle course between" the two extremes represented by R.A. G.S. and Superior Oil. 81 Stating that "the predicate acts must be ongoing over [a measurable] period of time so that they can ... be viewed as ... separate transactions," the court identified a number of "[r]elevant factors" that could be used to make this determination: "the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which they were committed, the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct injuries." 82 Because the acts of alleged fraud were distinct (relating to the original loan transaction and the ensuing foreclosure sale) and "ongoing over aperiod of nearly four years," the continuity aspect of the pattern requirement was deemed satisfied in Morgan. 83 Since Morgan, several appellate courts have embraced a multifactor approach. 84 In rejecting a bright-line test, these courts have abandoned any talismanic reliance on such buzzwords as "schemes" and "episodes," and have instead performed a more sophisticated "inquiry into the extent of the racketeering activity" 85 lenge posed by section 1961(5) more complex, the end result has been a more solidly consistent application of the treble damage remedy against those defendants posing the greatest criminal threat. Although Sedima cut short several early attempts to restrict civil RICO judicially, the situation makes it clear that the courts have failed to carry out Sedima's directive to develop a consistent and "meaningful" concept of pattern. 86 In fact, all three approaches proposed by the courts suffer from various inadequacies. The approach holding that just two related acts are sufficient to form a pattern, currently in use by the Fifth Circuit (and occasionally invoked by the Second and Ninth Circuits), glaringly ignores any requirement of continuity, thereby disobeying both congressional purpose 87 and Sedima's mention of continuity. 88 In turn, the multiple schemes approach presents courts with a formidable problem of definition and leads to an overly restrictive use of the civil RICO remedy. 89 Finally, while the multiple factors position properly focuses the debate toward continuity of conduct and recognizes that the pattern riddle cannot be solved through reliance on "schemes" or "episodes," the inclusion of certain factors (such as the requirement of a separate injury for each victim) has clouded the consistency and effectiveness of the standard. Ultimately, an analysis of the relevant statutory language, the legislative history, and the current state of civil RICO abuse suggests that focusing on the four key factors best highlighting continuity produces 
").
This last point, that pattern should mean different things depending upon which § 1962 subsection is violated, is most unusual. Absolutely no evidence exists to demonstrate that Congress intended a different definition of pattern to apply for each of the three subsections of § 1962. The Senate Report cited in Sedima made no distinction among the three provisions when it noted that pattern required "continuity plus relationship." See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 158 cited in Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. Further, § 1962 itself makes no distinction, and in fact uses the same language in all three subsections. See note 11 supra for the relevant statutory language. Finally, imposing a unique pattern requirement for each § 1962 subsection seems pointless, since it has been shown that over 97% of all RICO claims allege a violation of § 1962(c the proper balance between consistent application of the pattern requirement and respect for the legislative intent of RICO.
II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
The starting point in any question of statutory interpretation must be the actual language of the provision. 90 Because the word pattern, by itself, defies a precise description, 91 RICO's drafters attempted to define further the required level of activity sufficient for a pattern. Section 1961(5) states that a "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, ... the last of which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 92 As has been noted, this definition stands in "contradistinction"93 to the other definitions in section 1961 "in that it states that a pattern 'requires at least two acts'. . . not that it 'means' two such · acts." 94 Thus, section 1961(5) only establishes a minimum level of required conduct for RICO liability; a "sufficient" pattern of activity is never defined. 95 Because this definition simply places a floor on the number of predicate acts necessary for a pattern, and does not specifically quantify the level of wrongful activity necessary to sustain a RICO conviction, courts have differed sharply over the interpretative values of section 1961(5). Some courts have rejected attempts to narrow the statutory definition of pattern, stating instead that the language is "unambiguous. "96 These courts have found no need to inquire into RICO's legislative history or broader policy considerations to support their broad interpretation of the pattern requirement. The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that section 1961(5) is vague, noting that "in common parlance two of anything do not generally form a 'pattern.' "9 7 Because of this ambiguity, the Court found it necessary to look to other interpretive aids, like the legislative history. 98 Still other courts have noted that the "common sense interpretation of the word pattern 90 implies acts occurring in different criminal episodes," as opposed to two or three unrelated acts. 99 Because of this disagreement over the language of section 1961(5), any examination of the pattern requirement must go beyond the "plain meaning" of section 1961. 100 The plain meaning rule is usually invoked in situations where the statutory language is unambiguous. 101 The obvious inconclusiveness of section 1961(5) indicates that such a situation does not exist here. Thus, it is necessary to seek the aid of additional rules of statutory construction. One technique of statutory interpretation that has been generally accepted, 102 and has even been used to interpret RICO's pattern requirement, involves an analysis of the use of "pattern" in other federal statutes. In the section defining special offenders in Title X of the same Organized Crime Control Act, 103 Congress noted that a pattern of criminal conduct is formed "if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, . . . or otherwise are . . . not isolated events." 104 In its message to the lower courts to come up with a more consistent definition of pattern, the Sedima Court noted that this section could be used as an aid in interpreting RIC0. 105 Taking this lead, several courts have analyzed section 3575(e) of Title X and its legislative history and concluded that it supports a narrow construction of pattern in the RICO context. 106 (5) does not tell us which interpretation of pattern is justified, or how many acts (beyond the minimum of two) or separate schemes are required, neither can it be said that the section precludes fashioning a restrictive approach to pattern. Often, the courts that reject attempts to limit civil RICO through a narrow construction of pattern argue that section 1961(5) does not support such a restriction, since neither "schemes" nor "episodes" appear anywhere in the statute. 109 Given the vagueness of section 1961(5), however, this argument has little force. The lack of statutory precision requires courts to look for guidance beyond the particular wording of the statute.
In the effort to flesh out the best interpretation of pattern, courts will have to include guidelines to insure that consistent interpretations of the pattern requirement are rendered. Because of the ambiguity of section 1961(5), these guidelines must derive from sources outside the language. Thus, a "plain meaning" approach to this problem of linguistic construction is not helpful and recourse to both the legislative history and the problems plaguing civil RICO's current application is necessary. 110 107. Castle, 676 F. Supp. at 630 (emphasis in original) (using § 3575(e) to support multiple schemes approach).
108 Although the legislative history of RICO is well documented, no consensus has been reached as to exactly what type of behavior Congress wished to proscribe. Some commentators have concluded that Congress intended RICO as a specific response to the problem of criminal infiltration of legitimate businesses, 111 while others have uncovered much broader purposes from the legislative history. 112 Regardless of which interpretation one chooses, however, most observers generally agree that the major thrust behind Title IX was not so much the eradication of all organized crime, but rather the minimization of organized crime influence and control over legitimate businesses. 113 RICO was originally enacted as a response to studies that had demonstrated the extent to which organized crime had penetrated a wide range of legitimate businesses 114 from jukebox sales to securities firms. 115 In light of these findings, a key Senate proponent stated that RICO's principal aim was to "prevent organized criminals from infil- Because the presence of organized crime was so widespread in legitimate enterprises, Congress needed a statute that would target the specific conduct in which ci;ime syndicates were customarily engaged.117 But because of the constitutional prohibitions against punishing mere status, 118 Congress could not explicitly require the statute to reach only members of the Mafia. Consequently, the legislature drafted the language broadly. 119 In fact, the drafters were quite concerned that restrictive language could be used to escape criminal liability, and the operative statutory language was drafted broadly to prevent this. (1980) . Yet the provision itself refers to RICO's overall remedial purposes, which were to combat the increasing influence of organized crime. The clause should not be used as a crutch to support a prosecution in every instance of mail and wire fraud, especially given the fact that civil RICO was passed after the liberal construction clause was inserted. See notes 134-39 Infra and accompanying text.
In addition to preventing loopholes, RICO's creators were concerned with attacking the economic base of structured criminality.1 21 To effect this, wire, mail and securities fraud were added as predicate violations to prevent the illicit and economically harmful infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. 122 Further, a new remedy, criminal forfeiture, was added to the statute to deter criminal activity. This prosecutorial weapon compelled the forfeiture of assets used in connection with or derived from criminal enterprises. Criminal forfeiture provided an imposing supplement to the other traditional "economic" remedies, such as divestment and dissolution. 123 While RICO's framers intended to provide the government with the full panoply of criminal and civil remedies for use in the fight against organized criminal influence, RICO's extension beyond "structured criminal enterprises was intended to be incidental." 124 In order to limit RICO's application to structured criminality, the sponsors of the final Senate bill included the "pattern of racketeering" and "enterprise" elements as additional requirements. Senator McClellan, the major RICO proponent in the Senate, later emphasized that an individual had not only to commit RICO predicate violations, but to "continually engage" in a pattern of such violations so as to obtain an interest in an interstate business. 125 If these requirements were not met, then true racketeering activity was not present and the defendant was not subject to the penalties of Title IX. 126
For McClellan and the other Senate RICO supporters, the type of conduct that best characterized the true racketeer was planned, ongoing, and continuing illegal activity. As the Senate noted: "Title IX .. . is based upon the judgment that parties who conduct organizations .. . through a pattern of criminal activity are acting contrary to the public interest. To protect the public, these individuals must be prohibited from continuing to engage in this type of activity .... " 127 Given this goal, the "pattern of racketeering activity" requirement became the centerpiece of the statute. Although the legislators wanted to draft a statute broad enough to cover the traditional racketeer, there was concern that innocent businessmen would be harassed by an all-encompassing statute. 128 To ensure that RICO would only be used against the continuing offender, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted: The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the statute. One isolated "racketeering activity" was thought insufficient to trigger the remedies provided ... largely because the net would be too large and the remedies disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The target of title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one "racketeering activity" and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattem.129 In addition to this report, Representative Poff, a major sponsor of the House bill, stated that the pattern requirement meant "at least two independent offenses forming a pattern of conduct." 1 30
The broad goals of RICO and the design of the pattern requirement reveal that only those criminals who committed the multiple, independent offenses necessary to infiltrate a legitimate business were meant to bear civil RICO's harsh penalties. This goal is often ignored by courts, however, because the judiciary is faced with the contradictory task of reconciling RICO's broad language and liberal construction clause 131 with this narrow legislative goal, which clearly targets a specific criminal problem. Theoretically, a broad definition of "infiltration" or "enterprise" could result in a statute that punishes anyone who commits acts that an organized criminal might commit when corrupting a legitimate institution. Some have argued that RICO's broad language mandates such a result. 132 Construing RICO to reach all types of traditional fraud cases, however, merely exacerbates the problems of an obviously poorly drafted statute. Because Congress originally created the broad language to strike an economic blow against the varied illegal methods of a nationwide criminal syndicate, 133 using civil RICO's penalties in every instance of commercial fraud today warps the goals of a statute that was meant to target the more professional offender. 128 . In their condemnation of the overall bill, Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan stated that RICO "provides invitation for disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass inno· cent businessmen . 
Implications of the Private Attorney General Provision
A second reason for interpreting the pattern requirement narrowly derives from the fact that the private remedy, section 1964(c), was added to Title IX at the last minute, with very little debate or consideration of the possible consequences of a "private attorney general" provision. While the proposed provisions relating to governmental prosecutions were extensively surveyed, the bill that passed the Senate mentioned nothing about a private remedy. 134 The decision to add the treble damage provision was made by a House subcommittee 135 and was debated only briefly. 136 When the House passed the slightly amended S.30 without even a conference, Senator McClellan described the House amendment as a "minor change[ ]." 13 7 As Judge Oakes noted in the Second Circuit's Sedima decision, 138 the last-minute addition of a private treble damage remedy "indicates that Congress did not intend [section 1964(c)] to have the extraordinary impact claimed for it. Indeed, ... [t]he most important and evident conclusion to be drawn from the legislative history is that Congress was not aware of the possible implications of section 1964(c)." 139 When one considers how commercial fraud offenses 140 have come to serve as the basis for a vast majority of section 1964(c) filings, 141 the implications of this last-minute addition are significant. Originally, securities fraud was added to the list of RICO predicate violations because organized criminal syndicates had begun to infiltrate the securities industry. 142 Because the mail and telephone wires are obviously common tools used in the perpetration of this and other fraudu- [Vol. 86:1745 lent schemes, mail fraud and wire fraud were added as well. Yet the inclusion of these activities occurred before the addition of the private remedy, when Congress was concerned with providing the government (and not private litigants) with broad economic weapons to use against those who corrupted legitimate enterprises. While this does not mean that the private remedy should never apply to the commercial fraud offenses, no evidence exists to show that Congress intended for treble recovery every time a violation occurred that was of a type associated with organized crime. 143 Thus, rather than constituting a dramatic expansion of the enforcement of the federal fraud laws, the inclusion of a private cause of action should merely be seen as providing an additional weapon to use against the corrupt infiltration of legitimate commercial activities by organized crime.144 RICO's legislative history does not definitively answer the question of how best to apply the pattern requirement. However, several facets of this history should be kept in mind when considering the proper application of the statute. The first and most important factor to consider should be the congressional desire to stem the increasing infiltration of legitimate enterprises by illicit activity. 145 This desire must be the driving force behind the interpretation of both the criminal and civil components of the statute. Indeed, given that the private remedy received only cursory debate, consideration of this goal in the context of civil RICO assumes even greater importance. Second, the legislative history evinces a serious concern for the continuing offender.146 Despite RICO's sweeping language, Congress intended for all RICO defendants to meet several statutory requirements, since mere membership in "La Cosa Nostra" was not enough to trigger RICO liability.147 Consequently, Congress placed a "pattern of racketeering activity requirement" in the statute to identify a particular type of offender, the true racketeer. 148 Because these racketeers engage in planned, ongoing criminal activity rather than sporadic and isolated episodes of crime, the patterri element of the statute should be narrowly interpreted to target this type of prolonged criminal conduct. 144. In its recommendation to Congress, the ABA noted that the private remedy would "be a major tool in extirpating the baneful influence of organized crime in our economic life." 116 CoNG. REc. 25,190 (1970 Even though the legislative history suggests that RICO's applicability should be limited to the type of ongoing illegal activity associated with professional criminals, the current scope of civil RICO litigation has gone far beyond this goal. In 1985, the American Bar Association's Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force reported that 40% of civil RICO filings alleged securities fraud as the underlying predicate act, and an additional 37% involved allegations of common law fraud in a commercial setting. 149 A more recent survey shows that common law fraud constitutes the underlying dispute in almost 55% of all RICO claims, whereas securities fraud has dropped to 28.8%. 150 By contrast, only 9% of the hundreds of civil RICO filings involved claims based on predicate offenses commonly associated with "professional criminal type activity" 151 something more than standard commercial fraud. Today, RICO claims are being filed in almost every dispute involving a commercial transaction. 152 •. should fall off significantly"). Partially as a result of this decision, the securities industry, who before had been outspoken critics of civil RICO, has toned down its objections and lobbying efforts.
The need for clarification of the pattern requirement, however, will not be lessened, and may even be heightened, by this decision. Regardless of the forum in which these RICO claims are decided (arbitration vs. courts), the need to pinpoint the level of activity necessary to incur RICO liability remains as strong as ever. Indeed, if many RICO cases do move to arbitration, there will be fewer chances to develop and debate the pattern concept, since arbitral decisions will not contain extensive discussions of the relevant case law. Further, even if these claims are decided by arbitration, the right of appeal to the federal judiciary will still be in force. Consequently There are several reasons for RICO's expanding scope.1 56 First, the breadth of RICO's language, including such a diverse array of common offenses, practically invites a litigation explosion. The potential of treble recovery and the inclusion of mail, wire and securities fraud as predicate "racketeering" acts 157 also make it very tempting to include a RICO claim in any fraud dispute. "In view of the use of the mails and the telephone in virtually every business transaction," one Congressman has noted that "the private right of action under RICO effectively encompasses the universe of commercial disputes." 15 8 Indeed, it is so easy and tempting to allege a RICO claim that counsel may commit malpractice if a RICO claim is not made when the sec-. tion 1962 statutory elements have been satisfied.1 5 9 A second reason why plaintiffs find RICO attractive can be found in the statute's procedural rules, which not only contain liberal venue and service of process provisions, but allow very broad discovery as well. 160 For plaintiff corporations who are suing competitor corporations, such wide discovery can often yield valuable information. 161 In addition, including RICO claims usually raises the pressure to settle these vexatious suits, because the defendant's fear of being labelled a "racketeer" gives added bargaining leverage to the plaintiffs. 162 While the scope of civil RICO may not have reached the "out of control" stage that some have suggested, 163 it is clear that civil RICO has had unexpectedly and perhaps undesirably broad effects, especially in the past several years. 164 Indeed, the Court noted in Sedima that "in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original conception of its enactors." 165 Although originally intending to cripple organized crime, Congress has unwittingly contributed to the "[t]houghtless increase in federal jurisdiction."166 In 1985-1986, 41 .4% of all RICO filings contained no grounds for federal jurisdiction other than section 1962. 167 Thus, by following congressional intent and limiting civil RICO to true continuing offenders, courts could cut hundreds of cases from the federal docket each year.
While the evidence concerning legislative intent and subsequent abuse strongly suggest that civil RICO should be restricted, the proper role of the courts in this question is somewhat controversial. Some have asserted that the judiciary should be precluded from restricting civil RICO in any way, instead arguing that this task should lie with Congress. 168 While congressional action may be the ultimate way to correct the problems with civil RICO's application, the failure of the Blakey points out that, of the total federal filings each year, RICO claims would not exceed 5,000, or 2% of the total. Id. Regardless of the number, however, it is the type of defendant that is being sued, not the total number of filings, that is representative of RICO abuse. judiciary "to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern' " 16 9 has certainly contributed to the abuse of the statute. Interpreting the pattern requirement narrowly represents the best and, after Sedima, perhaps the only way for the courts to remedy this unfortunate contribution. Thus, by developing a consistent definition of pattern, the courts could both curb some of the abuses and restrict civil RICO to its intended focus.
IV. DEVELOPING A "MEANINGFUL CONCEPT": A MULTI-FACTOR Focus ON CONTINUITY A survey of RICO's legislative history demonstrates that the intended targets of the statute were those offenders who committed multiple and continuing offenses. The pattern requirement was inserted in the statute to so limit RICO. An examination of the subsequent case law, however, illustrates that RICO has been used in many unexpected areas. This has occurred mostly because of the failure of the courts to apply the key pattern requirement consistently and meaningfully. In trying to rectify this situation:, courts should strive for both consistency and a way to decrease RICO's expanding applications. This can be accomplished by focusing the pattern requirement on the criminals who commonly commit true racketeering crimes and who pose the greatest threat to legitimate enterprises. With these goals in mind, the multiple factor approach emerges as the optimal solution because it provides a comprehensive and consistent framework for pinpointing the continuing offender. By defining and then applying the four factors necessary to establish continuity, this section will demonstrate how a sophisticated inquiry into illicit conduct can result in the application of the treble damage remedy against those who most deserve the penalty.
A. Goals of an Optimal Pattern Requirement
In developing a meaningful definition of pattern, courts should be guided by two basic goals: a respect for congressional intent and consistency of application. These goals should be emphasized because the judicial treatment of RICO demonstrates that congressional intent has been largely ignored in the morass of inconsistent and unpredictable pattern cases. An optimal approach to pattern, therefore, will have to return RICO to its intended focus (by emphasizing relationship and continuity) and provide the courts with enough direction so that the current inconsistencies are avoided.
As to the first goal, the Senate specifically mentioned relationship and continuity when drafting the pattern requirement because it felt that isolated conduct should not merit RICO's penalties.17° By ensuring that a defendant's recurring acts bear some relationship to the plaintiff's injury, Congress hoped to eliminate the insidious influence of structured criminality as opposed to the effects of isolated activity. While many courts have successfully developed a workable test for relatedness, the more important continuity prong has proved far more difficult to define.
With respect to "relationship," most courts have articulated a test that closely parallels the definition of pattern in Title X. 171 These courts have taken Sedima's directive that this section "may be useful" in interpreting pattern and concluded that "similar purposes, results, . . . victims and methods of commission" in the perpetration of a fraudulent scheme present evidence of an adequate relationship. 172 Often, if a RICO injury results from two or more acts of racketeering activity, the plaintiff can show the requisite relationship between the acts simply by demonstrating that both acts were directed at the plaintiff. Thus, while two or three acts of mail fraud should not be enough to satisfy the continuity prong, demonstrating that the acts had similar purposes or were part of a common scheme (i.e., were related) generally does not prove difficult for the civil RICO litigant.
Proving the continuity element, however, should remain difficult for the RICO plaintiff. 173 Concentrating the pattern inquiry on prolonged criminal behavior constitutes the best way to achieve a key congressional goal: the limitation of treble fines to the true racketeer, "a person who commonly commits such [racketeering] crimes. '' 174 Unfortunately, while continuity may have been the concept that most concerned Congress, it is also the one that causes much of the present confusion. Any approach to defining pattern, therefore, will have to go beyond merely recognizing the importance of prolonged criminal behavior; 175 framework for defining continuity. The multi-factor approach suggested by this Note provides a rigorous examination of continuity and will allow the pattern requirement to perform the role it was intended to play -"focus the statute on continuing transgressors who pose the greatest threat to society."176 A second goal that an optimal interpretation of pattern should achieve is consistent and predictable application. The present situation of inter-and intra-circuit conflict cannot be allowed to continue. Not only do the approaches to pattern differ markedly among the federal courts, 177 but inconsistency prevails even within the application of the "multiple schemes" and "different episodes" approaches. A major problem with the current "schemes" and "episodes" tests is that a consistent definition of these buzzwords has never been developed. 1 7 8 Some courts seem to treat an episode as almost equivalent to a single act of racketeering activity, 179 while others view an episode as an entirely separate commercial transaction encompassing several acts. 180 Similarly, some courts have defined a scheme to encompass any one type of criminal activity, 181 whereas other courts have required "some kind of far ranging, multi-act criminal plot." 182 Thus, the inherent difficulties of applying these one-word interpretations of pattern has led to inconsistency and, even worse, unpredictability. Similar conduct should receive similar punishment, and the unpredictable application of the pattern requirement merely furthers the abuses documented above. The prospect of every commercial establishment in the nation wondering whether its one-dimensional dispute will trigger RICO liability is entirely unacceptable.
Using these goals as basic guidelines for defining pattern, only one of the approaches currently used by the appellate courts comes close to meeting the interpretive challenge posed by section 1961(5). The multi-factor approach provides the best solution to the pattern riddle because it recognizes that section 1961(5) cannot be interpreted by using such conclusory but no~defining terms as "schemes" or "episodes." In addition, the multi-factor approach recognizes, unlike the dangerous" to constitute a pattern but providing little guidance on what these terms mean). For similarly conclusory language, see the Ninth Circuit cases described in note 79 supra. two-acts-are-sufficient standard, 183 that continuity of conduct is a vital barometer of the type of behavior Congress intended RICO to proscribe. Although this section will propose a different and streamlined set of factors than courts currently use when measuring continuity, the basic notion of examining several facets of the defendant's criminal activity "strikes an appropriate balance between RICO's role as a flexible tool for discouraging criminal activity and the danger of allowing it to reach sporadic and isolated criminal activities."184
B. Factors Evincing Continuity
A properly conceived multi-factor approach attempts to remove from the pattern debate such conclusory terms as schemes and episodes, and replace them with a more comprehensive analysis that answers the questions those tests were also posing: Does the civil RICO defendant demonstrate a practice of criminal activity and commonly commit such crimes? In the early, post-Sedima stages of the pattern debate, when courts were trying to stem the tide of civil RICO abuse, the schemes/episodes tests were useful counterweights to the prevailing view that any two related predicate acts constituted a pattern. Generally, this contrast is still helpful since the approach solely emphasizing relatedness blatantly ignores Sedima's mention of continuity. But as the number of pattern cases has risen, and as the debate has grown increasingly complex and sophisticated, it is time to acknowledge that continuity must involve a factually oriented standard instead of a set rule. 185 The following four factors, some already in use by the courts and some not, would most effectively help the judiciary determine what constitutes continuous criminal behavior.
Number of Independent Victims
Frequently, a civil RICO claim will derive from a commercial dispute (usually fraud), 186 and the number of victims injured in this dispute can often suggest differences about the extent of the defendant's activity. [ Vol. 86:1745 that has been repeated. 187 Where these victims were separate purchasers or suffered distinct injuries, the activity becomes "the stuff of which 'patterns' may be found." 188 However, in cases where all victims were injured simultaneously through, for example, a single fraudulent tender offer or the issuance of bribe payments, the presence of multiple victims becomes less indicative of continuous illegal behavior. 18 9
Conversely, activity that defrauds a single entity creates "no inference that the [single] scheme embodies a threat of continued like activity in the future." 190 In fact, the presence of a single victim should give rise to a presumption against a pattern, especially when the duration of the illegal activity is short-lived. Cases involving a single victim usually contain only a "one-shot" effort to inflict a single injury, 1 9 1 which does not suggest that the defendant regularly engages in criminal conduct. With no evidence or threat of "continued like activity," the defrauded plaintiff should be limited to compensatory relief through other state and federal fraud remedies; with a single victim, treble recovery should not ordinarily be available. This is not to say, however, that cases involving a single victim ,should never give rise to treble recovery. A repeated infliction of economic injury upon a single victim, comprising several independent criminal decisions and continuing over a long period of time, could form the basis for a sufficient allegation of pattern. 1 9 2 This situation, unlike the "one-shot" efforts to defraud, gives rise to a reasonable inference that the perpetrator commits such crimes with regularity, or will commit them again. -1262) , the defendant prepared nineteen fraudulent invoices that were sent to the plaintiff (each involving two acts of mail fraud and one act of wire fraud) over a period of seven months. Since each invoice resulted in a distinct injury, the Seventh Circuit held that this "repeated infliction of economic injury" was sufficient to establish a pattern despite the presence of only one victim. 834 F.2d at 1305. See also Blue Cross v. Nardone, 680 F. Supp. 195, 199 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("repeated submissions of false claims over a thirteen month period form a pattern as defined by the Third Circuit").
193. Consequently, the presence of multiple victims should place the plaintiff's civil RICO insufficient activity for a pattern. 2 01 Despite this reasoning, the presence of criminal activity over a signifi.cant period of time still holds an influential place in the pattern debate. Duration should also be considered together with the factors described below, which highlight the number of illicit transactions or criminal decisions made by the defendant. Often, the reason why certain conduct is "time-limited" as opposed to "open-ended" derives from the fact that a single transaction or criminal decision itself has a fixed culmination.
Number of Illicit Transactions
Because of the number of civil RICO cases involving commercial disputes, it is often helpful to analyze the number of distinct commercial transactions present in a RICO dispute. In this context, a "transaction" refers to a separate, identifiable commercial transactione.g., a single securities offering, a single tender offer, a single audit engagement. 202 When multiple transactions are involved, the probability increases that the defendant is someone who regularly commits such crimes. For example, when the defendant prepares nineteen fraudulent invoices at separate times over seven months (and commits several acts of mail and wire fraud for each invoice), 203 the notion of the prolonged, continuing offender has generally been established. Alternatively, if fraud, bribery or other misconduct occurs in the course of a sole commercial transaction, courts should generally not find a pattern, even if the defendant has to commit numerous acts of mail or wire fraud to complete the criminal activity. 204 Thus, fraud or other misconduct committed in the course of (for example) a single stock offering usually constitutes the type of isolated offender that Congress specifically ordered not be subject to a racketeering claim. 205 201. 663 F. Supp. at 726. The court was also influenced by the fact that churning involves the same method of commission over and over again, rather than other criminal transactions, which involve other methods (like bribery, misrepresentations, etc. 
Presence of Separate Criminal Decisions
One important aspect of the number-of-transactions factor is that it distinguishes between suits that arise out of a single criminal decision and those that involve consciously separate criminal acts. Focusing on separate criminal decisions distinguishes these cases in the same way. What turns illicit acts into multiple criminal decisions is not easy to define, but one might consider the concept of new and independent formations of criminal intent. While no court has specifically referred to criminal decisions, several cases have suggested its importance. In Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. Touche Ross & Co., 206 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the multiple schemes approach because "on seven occasions defendants prepared false financial statements and rel,)Orts they knew would be mailed to the banks." In another case, the Seventh Circuit found a pattern because each fraudulent tax return filed was a separate lie and resulted in a separate underpayment, independent of the other lies and underpayments. 207 In both these cases, the court was impressed by independent formations of criminal intent that manifested itself in repeated criminal activity. 208 Just as in the transactions analysis above, the presence of several examples of criminal intent create an inference that the defendant commits such crimes with regularity and thus should bear RICO's severe penalties.209
Factors That Confuse the Analysis
While the above factors pinpoint the extent of a civil RICO defendant's criminal activity, other factors currently in use by the courts tend to cloud the pattern debate. For example, some courts have looked to whether each alleged act caused a separate and independent injury. 210 While distinct injuries might generally support finding a pattern, it is not necessary to require that each act cause a separate [Vol. 86:1745 harm, as all RICO requires is a single injury to business or property resulting from a pattern of conduct. As one court noted, "[i]t would be illogical to require a plaintiff to show that all ... acts . . . injured him, e8pecially in view of the fact that many such acts may be somewhat distinct and separate in time. " 211 Besides the independent-injury-causing-events test, courts have looked to the number of participants in the alleged crime, 212 the underlying purpose of the criminal scheme, 213 and the character21 4 and ultimate result 215 of the defendant's illicit activity. These factors are much less helpful in defining "pattern" because they do not focus on the continuing. extent of the perpetrator's activity. The purposes or i:esults of a criminal scheme tell us little about continuity or the defendant's proclivity for committing such crimes again. Similarly, the alleged character of the particular conduct, whether it be directed at a "legitimate goal" or more along the lines of traditional "mobster-type" activity, should not be decisive. RICO proscribes continuous illegal behavior regardless of the goals of the racketeering activity. 216 Ultimately, the four factors identified above provide the best approach to the pattern riddle. Unlike the approach solely focusing on relatedness, the multi-factors approach respects the command of Sedima and the intent of Congress to focus on continuity. And unlike the multiple schemes or different episodes tests, this analysis presents the judiciary with a workable, flexible solution that does not consist of conclusory and imprecise terminology.
C. Applying the Factors
When courts examine a RICO defendant's conduct using these four factors, they will gain a much more comprehensive perspective on the wrongdoer's proclivity for illegal behavior. Indeed, the factors listed in this Note provide the courts with a more finely tuned test for continuity than the other multi-factor tests currently in use. 2 11 To demonstrate this, consider the following two examples.
In Barkman v. Wabash, Inc., 218 a former shareholder of a target corporation brought an action against the target corporation, the acquiring corporation and other defendants, asserting various claims arising out of the allegedly fraudulent acquisition of the target company. The predicate acts included (1) mailing copies of the fraudulent tender offer to all shareholders; (2) receiving tendered shares and issuing payment through the mail; (3) mailing a fraudulent recommendation letter to all the shareholders; and ( 4) filing false statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 219
In such a case, a pattern is clearly demonstrated. First, multiple victims were harmed by the fraudulent tender offer, as each shareholder was personally defrauded out of varying sums of money. As the district court noted: "Each of the approximately 5,500 shareholders is an individual victim with a distinct injury .... " 220 Second, the fraudulent activity was sufficiently continuous over time. The earliest transaction, the defective SEC filings, occurred in November 1980, and the latest transaction, mailing cover-up payoffs to several brokerage houses, occurred in "early 1982." 221 Thus, despite the presence of only a single fraudulent scheme, the defendant's activity was sufficiently open-ended to create a strong inference that the defendant continually had "little regard for compliance with the law."222
While the third factor, multiple illicit transactions, cannot be demonstrated in this case since all the activity relates to one overall securities offering, this absence is more than offset by the presence of five independent criminal decisions. The defendants in this case first mailed the fraudulent tender offer and recommendations, induced the plaintiff-shareholders into selling their stock at an inferior price, filed fraudulent statements with the SEC, extended payoffs to several brokerage houses "aimed at concealing the overall scheme," 223 and finally failed to file an SEC disclosure statement. Each of these actions required separate formations of criminal intent, and were not just repeated instances of the same transgression. As the court noted in reference to defendant's conduct: "This is the stuff from which patterns may be found. the Supreme Court, provides an excellent illustration of how the four factors should operate. There, the plaintiff accused the defendant utility of conducting a far-ranging scheme designed to illegally influence several members of the state regulatory commission responsible for establishing telephone rates. 226 The allegedly corrupting acts included payments to several members of the commission, offers of employment to these commissioners, and assorted free gifts. 227 Although these illicit activities continued for over five years, the district court dismissed plaintiff's RICO claim because all the allegations were "committed in furtherance of a single scheme .... " 228 Applying essentially the same reasoning, the Eighth Circuit affirmed.229
Using the factors suggested in this Note mandates a different result.230 Even though the presence of multiple victims in this case is not truly indicative of continuous behavior since all the victims, the utilities customers, were injured simultaneously from each illegal act, the duration of the defendant's activity and the presence of numerous independent criminal decisions clearly indicate a pattern of racketeering activity. First, the illicit activity was sufficiently continuous over time, as the earliest attempts to influence the commissioners with gifts occurred in July 1980 and continued uninterrupted through 1985. 2 31 Second, and more vital, these actions required discrete formations of criminal intent. From an offer of employment made to a commission member in November 1984, to outright bribe payments offered to various members from 1983-85, to the provision of free vacations to still other commissioners during 1985, the defendant's conduct constituted several diverse and independently motivated crimes and were not just repeated instances of the same act. Attempting to influence several state officers through cash payments, job offers, and free gifts over a five-year period certainly creates a strong inference of continuous illegal behavior. The treble damage remedy should be available to its victims.
As Barkman and Northwestern Bell illustrate, analyzing a defendant's conduct using these four factors can properly identify the continuing offender, the criminal entity most deserving of the treble damage penalty. It is important, however, that courts apply these factors together and interchangeably. None of these factors should take on a life of its own, as have the multiple schemes and different episodes tests. As noted by the Seventh Circuit: "The doctrinal requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity is a standard, not a rule, and as such its determination depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, with no one factor being necessarily determinative." 232 By using these four factors together, civil RICO cases can be properly limited to the criminals presenting the greatest threat to society.
V. THE BROADER ISSUE: THE SUFFICIENCY OF CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS To AMEND CIVIL RICO While the suggestions made in this Note can help courts narrow civil RICO's applicability, the broader issue posed by the pattern debate still remains: how to amend civil RICO permanently. While the suggestions presented here for the interpretation of section 1961(5) can justifiably be undertaken by the judiciary after Sedima, more significant limitations of civil RICO will have to come from Congress. Currently, there are two proposals under consideration by Congress that would dramatically reduce the scope of the treble damage remedy. 233 These bills, S. 1523 and H.R. 2983, 234 ignore the pattern requirement altogether; rather, they attack the treble damage remedy by tailoring the level of recovery to the nature of the individual or entity injured. For example, under both bills, suits brought by "businesses" (which of course comprise a large percentage of civil RICO plaintiffs) would be limited to actual damages, attorney's fees, and costs, unless the wrongdoer had been convicted of an underlying predicate activity or RICO violation, in which case treble damage recovery would be allowable. 235 [Vol. 86:1745 In addition, under intense pressure from the securities industry, both the House and Senate bills would eliminate treble damages if either state or federal securities laws provide an "express or implied" remedy for the type of injury presented. This "securities exemption," however, would be disallowed if a violation of the federal insider trading statute was involved. 236 Unfortunately, neither S. 1523 nor H.R. 2983 addresses the requirements for a pattern of racketeering activity. 237 Insteaa, both S. 1523 and H.R. 2983 would virtually eliminate the treble damage remedy in many civil RICO filings. The main problem with civil RICO, however, is not with the treble damage remedy itself, but rather with how the remedy is applied. Determining the proper civil RICO defendant has become the issue that has most plagued the courts. Therefore, Congress should concentrate on the question of liability and what types of offenders it wishes to target, and not on the remedy provided. Certain "businesses," having engaged in repeated criminal activity, deserve RICO's harsh penalties regardless of who is bringing the suit. Limiting the treble damage remedy to government or citizen plaintiffs denies an effective remedy and deterrent to the class of business plaintiffs who have been injured by professional criminals.
Restricting the treble damage remedy is thus an inadvisable way to limit civil RICO. Indeed, the bills currently under consideration fail to resolve the basic problem with civil RICO: they do not identify or distinguish between the kinds of cases which should be brought under RICO and those which should not. Since the pattern requirement was originally designed to provide this guidance, the current congressional focus should seek to remedy the problems that result from its ambiguities. Thus, even if congressional legislation is passed shortly, 238 the problems of construing pattern will continue to plague the courts. 23 9 Since Congress has chosen to ignore this serious shortcoming of RICO, it is up to the courts to identify the kinds of cases that merit civil RICO prosecutions. Using the four factors outlined in this Note shou1d allow the courts to accomplish this task.
VI. CONCLUSION
The interpretive challenge posed by RICO's pattern requirement has caused one of the most divisive judicial conflicts in recent memory. This Note attempts to provide some clarity to the debate by providing the courts with a comprehensive framework for analyzing the merits of each RICO prosecution. By concentrating on the number of victims injured, the duration of the defendant's illicit activity, the number of separate transactions, and the presence of mu1tiple and distinct criminal decisions, courts will be able to apply consistently the treble damage remedy against the most pernicious offenders.
The broad language of RICO, originally drafted to enable government prosecutors to combat the increasing influence of structured criminality effectively, has been abused by private plaintiffs seeking treble recovery. Faced with RICO disputes better suited to state courts or more deserving of other federal remedies, courts have often tried to craft new restrictions onto the statute. While rejecting these attempts as illegitimate judicial lawmaking, the Supreme Court in Sedima redirected the judiciary's attention to a previously unexplored operative provision: the pattern of racketeering activity requirement.
Severe inconsistency has resu1ted because the Sedima Court provided little guidance in its opaque footnote 14. None of the major approaches developed by the courts of appeals can be consistently applied; even worse, none of these approaches respect Congress' original desire to deny to the continuing violator the economic fruits of organized criminal activity. By rejecting these approaches in favor of a more complex analysis, the mu1ti-factor approach can help the judiciary separate the meritorious RICO claims from the meritless ones. [Vol. 86:1745 Only then can the original designs of the federal racketeering laws be adequately respected.
-Ethan M. Posner
